As shown in the table above, the Republican percentage of the vote increased significantly in Wards 1 and 2, increased slightly in Wards 3, 4, and 5, and actually decreased in Wards 6 and 7.  In fact, the actual number of Republican votes decreased in Ward 6.  This trend can be studied more closely by comparing the changes for both parties in each ward, as shown in the table below:

GAINS OR LOSSES FOR BOTH PARTIES
            Republican    Democratic
WARD 1      78  12.60%   541  87.40%
WARD 2      90  17.79%   416  82.21%
WARD 3      64  12.80%   436  87.20%
WARD 4     131  19.29%   548  80.71%
WARD 5     140  19.86%   565  80.14%
WARD 6     -12  -1.98%   618 101.98%
WARD 7      76  12.34%   540  87.66%

Note that the Republican share of the increased vote was 17.79% in Ward 2, which is 11.61% more than what Bush received in the 2000 election.  This is also the ward where half the complaints (14 of 28) about touch screen voting machines were filed.  In Ward 1, the Republican share of the increased vote was 12.60%, which is 5.98% more than what Bush received in the 2000 election.  There were complaints filed here as well, in Precinct 1F, where the touch screen machine recorded “other candidates repeatedly.”  In Ward 3, where a complaint was filed in Precinct 3C, Bush’s share of the increased vote was 12.80%, which is 0.10% more than he received in the 2000 election.  This might seem insignificant were it not for the complaint that the touch screen “flashes and scrolls, shows different results or no results,” and for voting patterns in the other wards of Youngstown.

In Ward 4, Bush’s share of the increased vote was 19.29%, which is 5.55% less than he received in the 2000 election.  In Ward 5, Bush’s share of the increased vote was 19.86%, which is 2.39% less than he received in the 2000 election.  In Ward 6, Bush actually had a net loss of 12 votes, or -1.98%, which is 18.47% less than he received in the 2000 election.  In Ward 7, Bush’s share of the increased vote was 12.34%, which is 12.46% less than he received in the 2000 election.

It is entirely possible that the increases in Bush’s percentage of the vote in Wards 1, 2, and 3 of Youngstown were due to default settings for Bush on the touch screen voting machines.  Both the statistical evidence and the anecdotal evidence are entirely consistent with this conclusion.  Even in the wards where Bush lost ground to his Democratic opponent, default settings for Bush may have served to cut his losses.  The lack of posted complaints specific to these wards should not be construed to mean that all the touch screen machines in these wards were operating properly.

Touch screen machines are touted as a technological advance because they prevent all “overvotes,” ballots with two or more candidates selected for the same office, and because they prevent “undervotes,” ballots with no candidate selected, unless by deliberate choice of the voter. 

“Undervotes” have long been a real problem, undermining the ability of election results to reflect the will of the electorate.  Undervotes are especially common with punch cards.  If the machines are not emptied frequently they become filled with chads, which can prevent the voter from punching fully through the card, or prevent the voter from fully inserting the punch card into the machine, in which case the punches will not be aligned properly.  The machine will then fail to record a vote. 

It is an affront to voting rights for election officials to refuse to examine by hand the punch cards that the machines failed to identify as valid votes.  There are always people who go to the polls and choose not to vote for a presidential candidate, but not many.

Undervotes are less common with optical scanners, which are machines that scan paper ballots for marks made by voters in spaces next to candidates’ names.  There are always some ballots with marks that are not detected by the scanner, and these must be examined by hand if the will of the voter is to be determined.  Again, it is an affront to voting rights for election officials to fail to do so.  Machines should be utilized to minimize the number of ballots that must be read manually, but should not be assumed to eliminate this task altogether.

In Mahoning County, optical scanners were used for all voting in the 2000 election, and for absentee ballots in the 2004 election.  Again, the 2004 data are listed on the top lines, and the 2000 data on the bottom lines.

COMPARISON OF UNDERVOTES, 2004 AND 2000
                Cast     Counted    Uncounted
YOUNGSTOWN      29,016    28,676     340 1.17%
                26,223    25,103    1120 4.27%
SUBURBS         86,919    86,233     686 0.79%
                78,347    77,128    1219 1.56%
ABSENTEE        18,354    17,966     388 2.11%
                12,319    12,011     308 2.50%
COUNTY WIDE    134,289   132,875    1414 1.05%
               116,889   114,242    2647 2.26%

The percentage of uncounted votes in 2004 was twice as high for absentee ballots with optical scanners as for Election Day ballots with touch screens.  The problem with touch screens lies not in the number of undervotes, but in the reason why the number is so low.

One way to examine the Mahoning County election results is to look for the precincts with the most undervotes.

MAHONING COUNTY PRECINCTS WITH 2.5% OR MORE UNDERVOTES
Precinct         Reg Cast Turnout  Bush Kerry Undervotes
YOUNGSTOWN 5G    687  316  46.00%    19  247   44 13.92%
YOUNGSTOWN 3G    684  306  44.74%    26  263   13  4.25%
YOUNGSTOWN 3D    686  225  32.80%    16  192    8  3.56%
STRUTHERS 1B     460  237  51.52%    50  178    7  2.95%
CAMPBELL 4B      542  288  52.77%    53  225    8  2.78%
LOWELLVILLE 1    517  329  63.64%    88  230    9  2.74%
YOUNGSTOWN 1F    595  265  44.54%    16  235    7  2.64%
YOUNGSTOWN 3C    813  266  32.72%    34  218    7  2.63%

There are 312 precincts in Mahoning County.  In only 8 precincts was the percentage of undervotes 2.5% or more, and 5 of these precincts were in Youngstown.

Youngstown 3C, Tabernacle Baptist Church, 707 Arlington Street, Youngstown, was the one where the touch screen “flashes and scrolls, shows different results or no results.”  As a result, 7 undervotes were cast.

But without question, the most interesting of these precincts is Youngstown 5G, Hillman Elementary School, 164 West Myrtle, Youngstown.  There were 9 complaints about long lines, slow pace, and “planned confusion,” despite having 6 voting machines.  More importantly, this is the precinct where a voter pressed Kerry and the screen “went blank” four times.  Five attempts were required to cast a vote.  Apparently other voters had this problem also, as there were 44 undervotes, 13.92% of the ballots cast, three times the rate of any other precinct in Mahoning County.  It is obvious that nearly all of these were Kerry voters, as he won the precinct with 247 votes to 19 for Bush.  It is also obvious that the default setting on the defective machine was for no vote at all.  The complaint was not that Bush’s name appeared on the screen when voters pressed Kerry, but that the screen “went blank.”  This precinct serves to illustrate how many votes could default to an opposing candidate with one machine programmed in this manner.

Another way to examine the Mahoning County election results is to look for precincts with zero undervotes.  In the 2000 election, when optical scanners were used, there were 11 precincts out of 416, or 2.6%, where every ballot cast was counted for president.  In the 2004 election there were 21 precincts out of 312, or 6.7%, where every ballot cast was counted for president.

Without question, the most interesting of these precincts is Youngstown 2E, Price Memorial Zion Church, 920 Dryden Avenue, Youngstown.  There were many reports of voter suppression and intimidation here.

Since the 2000 election, the 19 precincts of Ward 2 have been consolidated into 12.  Price Memorial Zion Church was the polling place for more than one precinct, and voters were not told which side of the room to go to.  One voter had to go home, check her registration card, and return again to vote.  An 88-year-old woman who had voted at the same polling place for 40 years learned only on Election Day that her precinct had been changed and that her new polling place was farther away.

Another voter who had recently changed her address to this precinct was told by the Republican challenger that her name did not appear on the rolls.  When she stated her intention to vote at the precinct for her old address, the Republican challenger took her name and called ahead, so she felt she would be challenged again if she went there.  She was so upset by the challenge that she was afraid to vote even by provisional ballot, fearing that it would not count.  There were complaints at 7:00 AM, 9:57 AM, 10:26 AM, and 11:45 AM that the Republican challenger was intimidating voters, standing too close, leaning and looking over their shoulders.

But the most damning evidence about Youngstown Precinct 2E is the fact that no undervotes were reported.  This is the precinct where two voters selected Kerry and Bush’s name came up, where one voter had to scroll through five times before his votes were finally recorded, and where three voters said that the presidential option never appeared at all while they were trying to vote, and that this happened on two different machines.  How could a presidential option fail to appear on the screen, even on one occasion, let alone three times with three different voters, and no undervotes be cast?  By setting up a touch screen machine with an unseen default candidate, the one whose name sometimes appears against the will of the voters.

If touch screen machines are to be used, against the better judgment of this writer, it is essential to allow inadvertent undervotes by having a default setting for no vote at all, and that the machines function properly so that the number of undervotes is small.  To steer undervotes into the column of a candidate chosen by a computer hacker is nothing short of fraud.  The number of votes stolen in this manner may seem small in any given precinct, but it can happen almost everywhere at once, automatically, undetected, without a paper trail.

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