Dear Sir,
I have followed the discussions about voting machines and their use as they occurred before, during and after the 2004 election. As your recent article suggests they make a considerable contribution to the uncertainties raised in the last two presidential elections. It seems that there is no incentive with the current manufacturers to provide proof of performance.
I have no technical knowledge about the subject and as I am not an American I have no real idea about the voting procedures in your country.
I have the impression that several makes of voting machines are involved.
Ever since the 2004 election I have been wondering if there are people with technical knowledge to design and test a prototype of a satisfactory voting machine among those who believe that the present situation is fraught with problems.
My phantasy sees a computer unit, battery operated but also connected to power. This should provide continuity of power. The program is loaded via a disk, prior to use, in the presence of scrutineers and the same disk is used for all machines in the voting area. After the disk is loaded on the first machine a demonstration disk is inserted to proof the workings of the unit. The original disk is then again inserted. It may be necessary to include formatting on the original disk and the disk should give a reference number to the machine.
Every unit is sealed after the installation of the disk, only the battery compartment being accessible.
The selection of the candidate should be a "one-key" operation, a "re-do key" in case of error and a "confirmation key" which activates a counting mechanism and a print-out slip, which confirms the machine number and the choice. In case of problems the voter shows this slip to the election official who then will record a "manual" vote and keep the print-out as proof. The print-roll is to be of adequate size as the roll cannot be changed.
At the end of the process the unit is opened up in the presence of scrutineers, a button (which is only accessible at that time) causes the print-out of a summary tally. Alternatively the contents is transferred to another disk. The unit is resealed and stored for a period to provide evidence if required. The scrutineers being in attendance during the whole of this activity and be allowed to collect evidence of the transfer.
I feel a bit foolish now after having written this, but it seems so unfair to have all the wrangling going on without trying to come to a solution.
If the companies who provide this type of unit do not give the confidence that their products are satisfactory then, as I see it, a unit which can be demonstrated to be operating properly with extensive safeguards for the benefit of the voting public should be a vehicle to show up those manufacturers. Possibly it could be produced in competition to those manufacturers.
It would be nice if suitable people could be found within the ranks of people who are concerned about the matter of possible voting errors, who would be prepared to work together on a project like this.
Regards,
Harm
I have followed the discussions about voting machines and their use as they occurred before, during and after the 2004 election. As your recent article suggests they make a considerable contribution to the uncertainties raised in the last two presidential elections. It seems that there is no incentive with the current manufacturers to provide proof of performance.
I have no technical knowledge about the subject and as I am not an American I have no real idea about the voting procedures in your country.
I have the impression that several makes of voting machines are involved.
Ever since the 2004 election I have been wondering if there are people with technical knowledge to design and test a prototype of a satisfactory voting machine among those who believe that the present situation is fraught with problems.
My phantasy sees a computer unit, battery operated but also connected to power. This should provide continuity of power. The program is loaded via a disk, prior to use, in the presence of scrutineers and the same disk is used for all machines in the voting area. After the disk is loaded on the first machine a demonstration disk is inserted to proof the workings of the unit. The original disk is then again inserted. It may be necessary to include formatting on the original disk and the disk should give a reference number to the machine.
Every unit is sealed after the installation of the disk, only the battery compartment being accessible.
The selection of the candidate should be a "one-key" operation, a "re-do key" in case of error and a "confirmation key" which activates a counting mechanism and a print-out slip, which confirms the machine number and the choice. In case of problems the voter shows this slip to the election official who then will record a "manual" vote and keep the print-out as proof. The print-roll is to be of adequate size as the roll cannot be changed.
At the end of the process the unit is opened up in the presence of scrutineers, a button (which is only accessible at that time) causes the print-out of a summary tally. Alternatively the contents is transferred to another disk. The unit is resealed and stored for a period to provide evidence if required. The scrutineers being in attendance during the whole of this activity and be allowed to collect evidence of the transfer.
I feel a bit foolish now after having written this, but it seems so unfair to have all the wrangling going on without trying to come to a solution.
If the companies who provide this type of unit do not give the confidence that their products are satisfactory then, as I see it, a unit which can be demonstrated to be operating properly with extensive safeguards for the benefit of the voting public should be a vehicle to show up those manufacturers. Possibly it could be produced in competition to those manufacturers.
It would be nice if suitable people could be found within the ranks of people who are concerned about the matter of possible voting errors, who would be prepared to work together on a project like this.
Regards,
Harm