China carried out its first successful test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in January 11, 2007. Using a ground-based medium-range ballistic missile, the test knocked out an aging Chinese weather satellite about 537 miles above the earth on January 11 through kinetic impact, or by slamming into it. The first known satellite-killing test in space in over 20 years, the test has enabled China to become the third state with ASAT capabilities, second only to the United States and Russia. Since the test was known to the world in January 17, several countries including the United States, Japan and Canada had voiced concern over it. In the meantime, experts around the world speculated on China's incentives for the move.

Some arms control experts thought that it could precede a new round of Chinese diplomatic efforts to prod the Bush administration into negotiations over a space weapons ban. For more than a decade, particularly as U.S. missile defense plans and deployments have accelerated, Beijing has repeatedly urged participants in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament to hammer out a multilateral treaty to ban space weapons (the proposal is known as the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, or PAROS, treaty). But until recently the Bush administration has resisted such negotiations on the grounds that it needs freedom of action in space. Arms control experts believe that China's move could be explained by the same logic with which the United Stated pushed the former Soviet Union into arms control negotiations: In early 1980s, the U.S. deployed intermediate range missiles in an effort to push the Soviets into negotiations aimed at limiting this kind of weapons.

Other analysts have argued that the test was a shot across the bow of U.S. military power. Its purpose was to give the Chinese military the ability to blind American imaging satellites and hamper American military operations if there were to be a confrontation over Taiwan. In view of The American military's heavy reliance upon its satellites for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (alias C4ISR) missions, some Chinese experts have long argued that damage to those satellites could hobble American forces. The test is considered a component of China's unofficial doctrine of asymmetrical warfare, which calls on the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to rely on relatively inexpensive but highly disruptive technology to impede the American forces, which are better-equipped, better-trained but heavily reliant upon hi-technology.

However, although each speculation bears grains of truth in its line of reasoning, both explanations share a narrow focus on the military implications of China's ASAT test, while failing to address a fundamental puzzle: Why would China carry out such a provocative action when it is so painstakingly building up its image as a "peacefully rising (or, peacefully developing)" country in pursuit of a "harmonious world"?

In fact, the test almost immediately rekindled the "China threat" sentiment. U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney has commented that the "antisatellite test [is].not consistent with China's stated goal of a peaceful rise." U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said the incident was "troubling", while U.S. Senator Jon Kyl called it a "threat," a "provocation," and a "wake-up call." To the arms control community, the most troubling fact is that, defiant of years of global efforts on reducing the over 13 million pieces of space debris now orbiting in Space, the test created an estimated 40,000 more pieces of debris, among which over 600 might be large enough to endanger bypassing man-made space objects. While even only small pieces of debris could be lethal to satellites or spacecrafts, these pieces would remain in orbit for over a quarter century, or even longer. In view of the mess the test has created in outer space, there seems to be ground to question the sincerity of China's efforts to become a "responsible great power". Other China study experts remain puzzled over the test, as contrary to China's usual deft and smooth diplomatic practice, the test was "very un-Chinese": "There's nothing subtle about this".

Is there a way out of this riddle? How should we understand the seemingly self-contradictory action? What kind of country is China? In our opinion, it would merit a review of China's grand strategy before we could fully understand the driving forces behind the ASAT test in particular, and China's foreign behavior in general. By grand strategy, we refer to the fundamental strategies China adopts in pursuit of its political, economic, and military security. China's grand strategy, thus defined, is composed of two basic elements: on one hand, an emphasis on the priority of economic development, which entails a non-confrontational foreign policy and active merger into the international norm; on the other hand, preparation against the worst case scenario, which calls for building a more modernized armed forces. In light of China's particular characteristics and the international situation which we would elaborate below, China has to adopt a "hedge strategy", that is, instead of solely relying on one side, China is hedging between the two. The fundamental reasoning behind the strategy is: China believes it must concentrate on fostering rapid economic and technological developments till at least year 2020, the time period believed to be that of a strategic opportunity for China. Therefore, in order to keep the internal political stability and social harmony, China would need to keep a stabilized geopolitical situation, and to protect its security interests in its periphery or even at a bigger distance. The ASAT test is just a manifestation of the hedge strategy stemming from this grand strategy.

Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, held in 1978, the new generations of Chinese leadership has decided to concentrate on economic development. Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders carried out reforms meant to open up and foster domestic markets and tap into international ones. Since starting to open up and reform its economy, China has averaged 9.4 percent annual GDP growth, one of the highest growth rates in the contemporary world. In 1978, China's GDP accounted for less than one percent of the world economy, with a total foreign trade worth of $20.6 billion. By 2006, it accounted for about five percent of the world economy, with foreign trade worth of $1.7 trillion--the third largest national total in the world. By June 2007, China has attracted nearly 700 billion dollars of foreign direct investment, ranking top among the developing countries; in the meantime, China's foreign reserves have grown to 1332.6 billion U.S. Dollars, the largest number in the world. With commodities "made in China" sold all over the world, China has become a "world factory". It is generally believed that China's economy is still gaining momentum, making China the second world economic development accelerator after the United States.

As China carries on its economic reform policies, China's world views are undergoing a fundamental change. Before the reform era, Chinese leaders believed that the world was full of conflicts and struggles. In an effort to defend against Soviet threats, China established a quasi-alliance with the United States. After China entered the reform era, for a long term, international situation was still the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, as typified by the reciprocal boycott of Olympic Games hosted alternatively by these two countries, in 1980 and 1984. In addition, the Reagan Administration described the Soviet Union as an "evil empire", and initiated the Star War plans. However, during this time, China identified peace and development as the key themes of the era. Since then, China has strived to improve its relations with all nations of the world, with a particular attention on its neighbors and the United States. China has realized that a long-term peaceful international environment, particularly a benign neighborhood environment, is imperative for domestic economic development. Deng Xiaoping once pointed out that, "We take striving for peace as the primary goal of our foreign policy. Peace, the outcry of people around the world, is also the imperative for our construction. There cannot be any construction without a peaceful environment!" To achieve this aim, China has improved bilateral strategic relations with its former foes, including the former Soviet Union, India and Viet Nam, while striving to keep a stable strategic cooperation with the United States. The statistical figure about war and conflict also indicates that China has been following a non-confrontational foreign policy since 1980s-For a comparison, during the first 30 years of the People's Republic of China, from 1949 to 1979, at least 4 wars or conflicts erupted between china and other countries; while in the 26 years from 1980 to date, the figure has declined to only one.

China has also integrated into today's international system and helped to maintain it, since it has realized that, the current system, though not constructed by or for China, is conducive to its overall interests. In terms of international political institutions, China has become one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, which gives China the international prestige and status of a great power. Therefore, just like the United States which has the biggest say in the United Nations, China has no incentive to radically reform the United Nations. For all we know, in an international organization of nearly 200 member states, it is hard to get even three quarters majority for any reform plan. China not only did not table any reform proposal, but also set a strict precondition for other countries' proposal-a consensus through consultation among all members of UN.

In the respect of international economic institutions, after 15 years of arduous negotiation, China joined WTO on December 11, 2001. An important milestone in China's economic development history, China's entry into WTO has also strengthened the world multilateral trade system. As one of the principal beneficiaries of economic globalization, though still facing strong external pressure regarding the openness of its own market, China upholds free trade principle and spares no efforts in maintaining the existing system. Contrary to the expectations of some states, in WTO, China has never joined hands with other developing countries to oppose developed countries such as the United States, Japan and European countries.

In the respect of international security institutions, China continues to pursue a non-alliance stance, without entering into any formal military alliance with any states. In addition, it has taken part in most international arms control institutions, among which are the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In an effort to stabilize the Korean peninsula situation, China is also hosting the six-party nuclear talks, which involves the regional powers like DPRK, Republic of Korea, the United States, China, Japan and Russia. In any international conflicts which are not directly related to China's interest, China has generally urged the involved parties to engage in negotiations and dialogues. Indeed, for the first time since Opium War in 1840, China does not face immediate threat of foreign invasions. No doubt China has no incentive to subvert the favorable international security system.

Therefore, although China often states that it would work for "a fair and rational new international political and economic order", in terms of the core framework for the current international regime, it is actually a champion and vindicator for the "old" order, as it conforms to its own interests. In both domestic affairs and foreign policy, China has completed a transformation from a revolutionary to a status quo power. Unlike what many experts anticipated, as a rising power, China harbors no intention to challenge the existing international system, let alone breaking it with violence. Therefore, large-scale and fast-paced military buildup will not be china's top strategic priority for a long term to come. Its non-confrontational foreign policy is not a fig leaf, and there is no skeleton in the cupboard. However, China did indeed go astray from its long-held stance against space weapons and made the ASAT test, which we believe is motivated by the other part of China's grand strategy.

A non-confrontational foreign policy is doubtlessly China's aspiration, which has indeed arrived at some concrete results. However, the harsh realities of international power politics make China feel slightly ill at ease with the external environment. In China's view, although there are many foreign policy goals to be pursued, two factors stand out as most worrisome and troubling. The first is Sino-U.S. relationship; the second is the issue of Taiwan's secessionist movement. Unfortunately, the two factors are historically interrelated so that the situation has become further complicated.

Currently, the United States is the only country with the capacity and ambition to exercise global primacy. This means the United States is the country that can exert the greatest strategic pressure on China. Because of the sizeable gap between the two countries in national power and international status, it is only natural that in their exchanges, the United States is in the offensive, while China takes the defensive role. Meanwhile, China must maintain an amiable relationship with the United States if its modernization efforts are to succeed. Indeed, a cooperative partnership with Washington is of primary importance to Beijing, where economic prosperity and social stability are today's top concerns.

However, there is a deep mistrust between the two countries. First of all, this mistrust stems from geopolitical power transformation brought about by the rise of China, the new reality of our times. Many American strategists take it to be a history law that in international relations, dominant states typically want to preserve the status quo and rising states want to change it with violence. To them, China will inevitably follow the path of Germany leading up to World War I or those of Germany and Japan leading up to World War II, when these countries plundered resources and pursued hegemony with violent force. This has been called "the tragedy of great power politics". On China's side, following the same line of logic, some people believe that the United States is bent on forestalling China's rise. For example, many Chinese, especially the military thinkers, remain convinced that the 1999 cruise missile bombing on their embassy in Belgrade was deliberate. Pointing to the state-of-the-art U.S. reconnaissance technology, they hold on to the belief that the attack was intended as a message to China: beware of U.S. power.

As a matter of fact, the U.S. has been preparing for the challenge that might be brought about by China's rise, especially in the military arena. Since 2000, the U.S. has published an annual special report on China's military power, keeping on pressing China on issues like the growth rate of China's defense expenditure and its military transparency. In addition, The U.S. has pressed hard on the European Union to sustain its arms embargo against China, while enhancing its own constraints on sensitive high-tech exports to China. After the end of the Cold war, with the vanishing of the Soviet Union as its principal opponent, the U.S. has kept its military alliance regime in East Asia, paying special attention at strengthening the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance to prevent China from dominating East Asia. In the year 2007, the joint military exercise by the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia, as well as the tri-lateral security dialogue among the U.S., Japan and Australia, both clearly reflected the strategic intention at Containing China.

Secondly, in terms of bilateral relations, in view of the deep cleavage between them regarding political system and ideology, China and the United States cannot hope to establish real friendship based on a common value system. Since the Soviet Union's collapse in the late 1980s, Chinese leadership has rested the legitimacy of its governance on two cornerstones: developing domestic economy and promoting patriotism (or nationalism). Precisely at the same time, U.S. policymakers seem to be reaching a conclusion: the current Chinese government is a relic of the communist era, a page that has already been turned. Many Americans assumed that the tide of freedom and democracy sweeping through the globe would soon wash away the remaining communist rule in China. Yet while Americans are trying to promote democracy by supporting dissents, criticizing china's human rights record and so on, the Chinese fear that their newfound peace and prosperity might not last.

According to an official document released by the U.S. government, the U.S. believes that "China faces a strategic crossroads". According to the report, the three ways facing China are: "It can choose a pathway of peaceful integration and benign competition. China can also choose, or find itself upon, a pathway along which China would emerge to exert dominant influence in an expanding sphere. Or, China could emerge less confident and focused inward on challenges to national unity and the Chinese Communist Party's claim to legitimacy. The future of a rising China is not yet set immutably on one course or another." The U.S. speculation, thus articulated, means that the U.S. is still at a loss as to where China would be heading. As a corollary, the U.S. adopts a hedge strategy towards China, stressing on both engagement and containment. "Uncertainties about how China will use its power will lead the United States - and others as well - to hedge relations with China. Many countries hope China will pursue a 'Peaceful Rise,' but none will bet their future on it", said former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. This explains the reason why people doubt the consistency of the American China policies.

Thus, the deep mutual mistrust between the U.S. and China has cast a long shadow of potential bilateral strategic competition, though in the foreseeable future, it does not necessarily lead to a large-scale military confrontation between the two. However, the issue of Taiwan's secessionism does have the formidable potential of resulting in a direct military conflict between China and the U.S.. As an old friend of Taiwan's and a supporter of what it takes to be a naissant democracy in Taiwan, the United States cannot abandon its security commitment to Taiwan without a just cause, as it would be taken as a testimony of the reliability of its security commitments to its allies. The current Chinese leadership, following Deng's maxim, is determined to avoid conflict along its borders so that it could focus on economic development. Yet, despite diverse views and opinions regarding internal an external issues, there is a general consensus among Chinese that Taiwan must stay within the territory of China. No Chinese leader can ever afford to be seen as the one who "loses" Taiwan perpetually.

Currently, in order to stabilize the Asian situation and focus its attention on anti-terrorism, the United States have arrived at some tacit agreement with China over maintaining the status quo. However, due to the evolution of political system and the rise of secessionist faction within Taiwan, the Taiwan issue remains volatile. Since mid-1990s, especially after the Democratic Development Party (DDP) gained power in 2000, statements and actions made by Taiwanese leadership indicate that it may be capable of making unilateral changes to the status quo. According to the long-held popular opinion, Taiwan is an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for the U.S. in Asia; Taiwan is a U.S. strategic anchor in the Far East; it serves as a U.S. tool to "contain China with Taiwan". In general, Taiwan is a chessman at disposal of the U.S.. This view, however, is challenged by the following facts:

In January 29, 2006, Chen Shui-bian, the leader of Taiwanese authorities made a Lunar New Year speech in which Chen said he would 'seriously consider' scrapping Taiwan's National Unification Council and the guidelines it has established for eventual reunification with the mainland. In Feb. 14, Bush secretly sent his Whitehouse National Security Council Asia specialist, Dennis Wilder, as a special envoy to Taiwan, telling Chen that the U.S. "was deeply concerned, cannot accept, and would not support" Chen's move. However, Chen did not back down. In Feb. 27, Chen Shui-bian formally announced that the National Unification Council ceased to function, and that the National Unification Guidelines were scrapped.

In March 15, 2007, Taiwanese ruling DDP formally initiated steps to stage a "referendum on Taiwan's U.N. membership" (a referendum regarding entering the United Nations under the name Taiwan), whose aim was to show that "Taiwan is a sovereign state" and that "Taiwan is the name of a state". In Aug. 27, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte expressed the official stance of the U.S. government that the referendum was a mistake and that it would be viewed as "a step towards independence". In Sep. 6, U. S. president George W. Bush told China's President Hu Jintao in Sydney, Australia that he opposed any unilateral move at changing the status quo of cross-strait relationship. Still, by Sep. 10, Taiwanese leader Chen Shui-bian formally announced that the "Entry into UN" referendum will be held together with the "presidential" election in March 22, 2008.

Both incidents have apparently violated Chen Shui-bian's pledge of ""five no's" policy" ---- no declaration of "independence", no change in its so-called "national title", no push for the inclusion of the so-called "state-to-state" description in the constitution, no promotion for "referendum to change the status quo in regard to the question of independence or unification", and no question of abolishing the "National Unification Council" and the "National Unification Guidelines". It has been believed that the pledge was mainly made to assure the U.S.. However, in the abovementioned two incidents, the Taiwanese have broken loose of the American grip and made their own choice. Due to the popular secessionist propensity coupled by the mechanism of electoral politics, Taiwan is no longer a chessman at the disposal of the U.S., rather its secessionist movement is increasingly testing the effectiveness of joint Sino-U.S. efforts in maintaining the status quo of cross-strait relations, the failure of which is likely to drag three parties into a war over Taiwan.

This is the "new reality" that both China and the U.S. have to address today. The sole reason that pro-independence forces in Taiwan do not fear military consequences is that the U.S. has made a security commitment, albeit ambiguous. What would be the consequences of the U.S. intervening in the conflict over Taiwan Strait as a result of Taiwan's secession? China feels unassured.

It is in this context that, on the one hand, China adopts a hedge strategy in dealing with Sino-U.S. relations and the Taiwan issue. Specifically, with regards to Sino-U.S. relations, China is both cooperative and cautious; while in dealing with Taiwan issue, China is both striving for peace and stepping up the military preparations.

In terms of international politics, China has been calling for a multi-polar world, but has never taken concrete steps, such as building an anti-American international alliance, to challenge the U.S. unipolar hegemony. To the contrary, by actively integrating into the international regime dominated by the U.S., China in fact acknowledges and tolerates the U.S. hegemony, thereby stabilizing the bi-lateral relations.

When facing U.S. criticism regarding China's human rights, religious freedom, and the development of democracy, China has always rejected these charges on the grounds that these charges are acts of interference in China's internal affairs. In addition, while the U.S. has listed the promotion of global democratization as one of its main goals for diplomatic strategy, China, in an effort to relieve the strategic pressure from the U.S., has made special efforts in maintaining relationship with the states that are apparently not American favorites, including DPRK, Cuba, Burma, etc.

In economic affairs, China has realized the significance of American capital, technology, market and modern enterprise institutions to China's eventual modernization. Therefore, although the two have engaged in conflicts regarding trade surplus, market entry, RMB exchange rates, intellectual property protection, food security, etc., approaching the brink of a trade war for several times, the economic relations is actually the most stable part on the bilateral relations, from which both sides have gained substantial benefits. In addition, a review of the Sino-American conflicts in economic arena would illustrate that China is usually the one making concessions. A most typical example is the exchange rates for RMB. China has enjoyed a huge trade surplus over the U.S. for years, reaching a record high of 144.26 billion U.S. dollars in 2006 by Chinese statistics (the figure is 233 billion by U.S. statistics, one third of the overall U.S. trade deficit). As a result, the U.S. accused China of manipulating foreign exchange rates and pressed China to appreciate its currency. After several rounds of negotiation, China had the concession, and the RMB rate is appreciating incrementally, at over 10 percent by now. The attritions in other areas, such as intellectual property rights protection and market entry, are also being settled following the similar pattern of China yielding to U.S. pressure.

The huge gap between the economic status between the two countries, as well as the reliance of China's export-oriented economy on U.S. markets, have forced China to adopt a mainly reconciliatory policy towards the U.S. in economic affairs. However, in the sensitive fields such as energy and industrial raw material supplies, China has kept a wary eye on the global market mechanism dominated by the U.S.. That China has taken steps to develop strategic relations with Russia and mid-Asian states can be viewed as efforts to safeguard its energy supply. In recent years, China has reached as far as Latin-America and Africa in search of energy supplies.

In terms of military, or defense issues, China has never engaged into a full-scale arms race with the U.S. or spent the economic gains into expanding its military forces, as the Soviet Union used to do. To the contrary, China has kept its nuclear arsenal on a small scale, held a restrained attitude towards developing military alliance with other countries, and maintained a disproportionately low defense expenditure as compared to the U.S.. In general, China is maintaining a defensive posture in defense affairs.

However, it is also in this field that China shows its hedge against possible confrontation between the two countries. For one thing, in 1991, the U.S. had exhibited its sophisticated technology and combat capabilities in the Gulf War, alerting China to the fact that obsolete military force structure, military theories, and defense capabilities will only invite devastating strikes in modern warfare, which reminded it of the tragedy of the Qing Dynasty in 1840. Since then, China has abandoned Deng Xiaoping's demand that "the military forces should forbear", and the Chinese military budget has seen an annual growth rate of double digits (in terms not adjusted for inflation) for 16 years since then. For another, China is modernizing and enlarging its small nuclear arsenal to a certain extent. (It could, according to a U.S. Department of Defense estimate, possess 60 intercontinental ballistic missiles by 2010.) With regards to the U.S. backing out of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM treaty) and deployment of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System, China has expressed its strong objection and started to develop its own countermeasures to ensure a minimal deterrent against the U.S.. In terms of conventional capabilities, China has been trying to elevate its capability to "win a local war under information situations" by streamlining its army and purchasing sophisticated weaponry from Russia.

To deter Taiwan's secession, China is also hedging. On the one hand, Beijing openly expressed its "sustained policy of betting on the Taiwanese people", and that "Taiwanese compatriots are our brothers, an important force in developing cross-strait relations, and also an important force in curbing the Taiwan secessionist sects". Currently, Beijing's Taiwan policy has been pragmatic, aiming at curbing secessionism and maintaining the status quo, rather than pushing for unification.

In the meantime, China has been using diplomatic pressure to minimize Taiwan's international political living space by vying for diplomatic recognition from the few African, Latin-American and South Pacific countries still recognizing Taiwan. Domestically, China passed the "Anti-Secession Law" in 2005, which drew a red line for the Taiwanese secessionist behavior, while providing the legal basis for solving the Taiwan issue by force. On the one hand, China stepped up communication and dialogue with all political parties in Taiwan, even holding talks with leaders from the out-of-power parties; on the other, China insists on no-contact with the ruling Democratic Progress Party (DPP) which follows a secessionist line, thereby to stress that its "one-china policy will never waver".

In economic affairs, China has been active in attracting investment from Taiwan. Today, hundreds of thousands Taiwanese businessmen have invested a total of 80 billion U.S. dollars in the Mainland. Beijing even passed a law, ----Taiwanese Compatriots Investment Protection Act, dedicated to the protection of these Taiwanese businessmen. Meanwhile, China has also been using the huge domestic market formed after the reform era to deepen Taiwan's economic reliance on the Mainland. According to statistics, in 2006 alone, the cross-strait trade had exceeded 100billion U.S. dollars in total, with the Taiwanese trade surplus of 66.3 billion U.S. dollars.

On the other hand, Beijing is also using economic tools to curb the Taiwanese secessionists. For example, some of the Taiwanese investors in Mainland are sympathetic or even supportive of the secessionist movement, who openly endorsed the DPP and provided political donations. In May 2004, the overseas version of China's official People Daily published on its first page an article entitiled "We do not welcome the 'Green' Taiwanese businessmen like Xu Wenlong", accusing these people of "making money from the Mainland while engaging in Taiwanese Secessionist Movements". The huge official pressure forced some Taiwanese businessmen to openly denounce Taiwanese secessionism. For example, Xu Wenlong of the Jimei Group Co. ltd had openly supported the Anti-secession Law. It can be expected that although Taiwanese leaders have been wary of the economic reliance on the Mainland, and taken steps to divert Taiwanese investment from the Mainland, in the long run, China will gain an upper hand with regards to Taiwan from its expanding economic power.

China has reiterated its emphasis on "never abandoning efforts to unify Taiwan with peaceful means", while keeping on efforts at military preparations. Through defense acquisition and development, China has greatly elevated its naval and air forces. China has also kept on an annual growth rate of 100 missiles deployed across the Strait, and frequently staged military exercises along its South-eastern seashore. In view that Washington is highly likely to intervene with force should a conflict across the Taiwan Strait occur, the ASAT test can be seen as part and parcel of the military buildup.

However, the military buildup does not mean that China has scheduled the agenda for reintegration with Taiwan by force, let alone any plan or even intention at looting resources or pursuing hegemony by military force. As is discussed above, a peaceful, benign international environment is in China's overall interests and it wants to preserve key features of the current world order. Yet, in order to deal with complicated reality, Beijing has to have two strings to its bow.

Therefore, drawing on the logic of hedge strategy, we feel comfortable to anticipate even more seemingly Chinese self-conflictive phenomena in the foreseeable future, just like the tension between promoting a harmonious world and military buildup, as has been exemplified by the ASAT test.